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Abstract— The National Compact Stellarator Experiment 
(NCSX) was designed to test physics principles of an innovative 
stellarator design developed by the Princeton Plasma Physics 
Laboratory and Oak Ridge National Laboratory. Construction of 
some of the major components and sub-assemblies was com-
pleted, but the estimated cost and schedule for completing the 
project grew as the technical requirements and risks became 
better understood, leading to its cancellation in 2008. The pro-
ject’s risks stemmed from its technical challenges, primarily the 
complex component geometries and tight tolerances that were 
required. The initial baseline, established in 2004, was supported 
by a risk management plan and risk-based contingencies, both of 
which proved to be inadequate. Technical successes were 
achieved in the construction of challenging components and sub-
assemblies, but cost and schedule growth was experienced. As 
part of an effort to improve project performance, a new risk 
management program was devised and implemented in 2007-08. 
It led to a better understanding of project risks, a sounder basis 
for contingency estimates, and improved management tools. Al-
though the risks ultimately were unacceptable to the sponsor, 
valuable lessons in risk management were learned through the 
experiences with the NCSX project.  
Keywords –stellarator, NCSX, risk, management 
I. THE NCSX PROJECT 
The National Compact Stellarator Experiment (NCSX) 
was designed to test the physics of a compact, quasi-
axisymmetric stellarator (QAS) configuration.1,2 The QAS 
uses three-dimensional stellarator magnetic fields for steady-
state, disruption-free operation but has a tokamak-like mag-
netic field symmetry in magnetic coordinates. A steady-state 
QAS reactor would have a net toroidal current due to the boot-
strap effect but would not require externally-driven current 
profile control, nor active feedback control of ELMs and other 
instabilities. The NCSX design and construction project was 
undertaken as a partnership between Princeton Plasma Physics 
Laboratory and Oak Ridge National Laboratory. 
 
The NCSX design was based on a magnet configuration 
that was generated by a numerical optimization process to 
provide plasmas with attractive physics properties within en-
gineering feasibility constraints. The three-period magnet sys-
tem consisted of 18 modular coils (six each of three different 
shapes), plus toroidal field, poloidal field, and trim coils. The 
modular coils and plasma are depicted in Fig. 1. The major 
radius R is 1.4 m, the aspect ratio R/〈a〉 is 4.4, the magnetic 
field on axis B0 is ≤ 2 T, toroidal currents IP up to 320 kA are 
supported, and the pulse length is 0.5 to 2 s depending on the 
magnetic field strength. 
 
Accurate realization of the magnetic configuration was a 
key NCSX requirement, one that has been achieved in the con-
struction of previous stellarators, e.g., HSX3, Wendelstein 
7-AS4, LHD5 and ATF6, as well as Wendelstein 7-X7 (under 
construction). Comparable accuracy requirements apply to 
tokamaks, including ITER. Of greatest concern for NCSX 
were low mode-number resonant magnetic field perturbations 
which can produce islands at magnetic surfaces where the ro-
tational transform goes through rational values. The project’s 
strategy to minimize resonant field errors in design and con-
struction consisted of: 
• Accurate construction (tolerance on the completed modu-
lar coil system ±1.5 mm, or ~R/1000 as is typically 
achieved in stellarator construction) 
• Low magnetic permeability (µr < 1.02 for components 
close to the plasma). 
• Low eddy currents (material choices; insulating breaks in 
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Fig. 1. Modular coils and plasma configuration. 
 
Fig. 2.  NCSX stellarator device design (CAD model). 
structures) 
• Low stray fields from coil leads, feeds, crossovers. 
• Stellarator-symmetric design. 
• Minimization of coil deflections under load. 
• A system of trim coils for field error control. 
 
The complex coil geometry and the accuracy requirements, 
especially the fabrication and assembly tolerances, were rec-
ognized from the outset as major technical risk factors.  
 
A self-consistent design (Fig. 2) satisfying all mission re-
quirements was presented in 2003. Construction began in 2004 
but was terminated by the sponsor in 2008. By then, with the 
project about half complete as a result of significant technical 
accomplishments8, the estimated cost at completion had in-
creased by about 70% and the forecast completion date had 
slipped by about 4 years. A major factor, perhaps the dominant 
factor, in the cancellation decision was the lingering uncer-
tainty, well into the construction phase, in the cost and sched-
ule forecasts. The project was unable to meet the sponsor’s 
expectations for cost and schedule predictability; hence its 
failure was in essence a failure to adequately manage the risks. 
This paper, written by responsible members of the project’s 
management team, presents an analysis of NCSX risk man-
agement efforts with lessons learned based on project experi-
ence and results  
 
II. DESIGN MEASURES TO MITIGATE TECHNICAL RISKS  
The engineering design of the modular coil array was 
based on a thick-section shell-type structure, with the coils 
supported on the inside surface, to minimize the risk of deflec-
tions under operating conditions (Fig. 3). The entire magnet 
system was designed to be pre-cooled to cryogenic tempera-
ture (80 K) with heat removed between pulses. This robust 
concept was adopted in the early design stages to minimize the 
risk of concept failure (which would have had enormous 
schedule consequences) as the design development progressed 
and the requirements became better understood. The modular 
coil shell was divided into eighteen sectors, one per coil. The 
coils were wound directly onto accurately machined support 
features on these shell sectors, called modular coil winding 
forms (MCWF, Fig. 4). The coils were wound with copper 
conductor and then epoxy-impregnated. (Fig. 5) All 18 modu-
lar coils were fabricated.  
 
The NCSX vacuum vessel was designed to provide as 
much interior volume as possible to minimize the risk of en-
croachment into the plasma. The size was limited by the mini-
mum assembly clearance (5 mm) required for installation of 
the modular coils over the vessel sectors (with ports removed). 
This resulted in a vacuum vessel shell (Fig. 7) with a non-
axisymmetric shape that resembles that of the plasma and 
which had to be realized within ±3 mm accuracy. The vessel 
was constructed in three identical sectors, one per field period. 
 
Fig. 3.  Modular coil system design. 
 
Fig. 4.  Modular coil winding form. 
Inconel was chosen as the vessel material to reduce magnetic 
permeability and eddy current risks.  Fabrication of all three 
sectors and their associated ports, and installation of external 
services (e.g., cooling lines), were completed. 
 
The machine assembly plan was based was on the 
construction of three modules, or field periods. The critical 
field period assembly steps are illustrated schematically in 
Fig. 8. The completed modular coils are first assembled into 
half-period subassemblies of three coils each, two of which are 
installed over a vacuum vessel sector, complete with insula-
tion and other installed services. After installing ports and 
outfitting the three field periods with additional equipment, 
they would be brought together and joined to complete the 
torus assembly. Due to the stringent tolerance requirements, 
sophisticated metrology systems and frequent measurements 
were needed throughout the fabrication and assembly proc-
esses in order to ensure compliance. The cost and schedule 
impacts of metrology operations and the associated engineer-
ing analysis activity proved to be a major cause of cost and 
schedule growth (a risk that was recognized but under-
appreciated at the project outset). During the design process 
and, later, when evaluating the vacuum vessel inspection data 
against acceptance criteria, CAD simulations of coil installa-
tion over the vacuum vessel with its installed services were 
performed to reduce risks of interferences during assembly. 
Special assembly tooling including a novel guidance system 
was designed and fabricated to further reduce those risks. Two 
half-period coil subassemblies were fabricated and a trial in-
stallation of a half-period over a vessel sector were completed. 
 
A system of trim coils, consisting of 48 rectangular coils 
arranged around the machined, was planned for controlling 
field errors. Monte Carlo simulations of potential construction 
errors, i.e. displacements of coils and subassemblies from their 
nominal positions, and an inventory of field errors from 
known sources such as coil leads, magnetic materials, etc., 
were used to set requirements. Analysis showed that the coils 
could reduce magnetic islands to acceptable size in the pres-
ence of simulated and known construction errors. A safety 
factor of at least 2 in the required current could be provided 
cost-effectively, providing extra margin that could be used if 
necessary to compensate for out-of-tolerance construction 
errors. Trim coils thus provide the option of accepting such 
variances and avoiding the costly and time-consuming re-work 
needed to correct them. In this sense, trim coils offered a 
means of mitigating cost and schedule risks during construc-
tion and performance risks during operation.  Their potential 
was not fully explored, however, before the project closed. 
III. MANAGEMENT OF PROJECT COST AND SCHEDULE RISKS 
A. Establishment of Project Baseline, 2004 
The project cost and schedule baseline was established in 
February, 2004 following a preliminary design review and two 
cost and schedule reviews in the Fall of 2003. At that time, the 
top-level project requirements were well established (and re-
mained stable thereafter) and engineering design development 
had been in progress for about three years. Subsystem designs 
varied in their degree of maturity, with the modular coils and 
vacuum vessel having received the most attention due to their 
high technical risks, and therefore being the most advanced. 
The estimates for those components were supported by manu-
facturing and cost studies performed by competent industrial 
suppliers.  Prototypes had not yet been manufactured, but in 
view of the recognized technical challenges, well-defined 
plans for manufacturing process development and prototype 
fabrication by competing suppliers were included in the pro-
ject baseline. Assembly planning was at a conceptual level. 
 
The project’s baseline was accompanied by a risk man-
agement plan that established line responsibilities for risk 
management and defined the project’s program for identifying, 
mitigating, tracking, and retiring risks. The plan was not quan-
titative, however, in that there was no provision for assessing 
the probability of a risk occurring, nor its cost and schedule 
consequences if it did occur. The plan did recognize the risk of 
cost and schedule overruns due to many factors. Design de-
lays, with attendant cost growth, had a been a problem 
throughout conceptual and preliminary design and were seen 
as a continuing risk. The cause was attributed to the difficulty 
of the design itself, which had challenged the technological 
 
Fig. 8. NCSX Field Period Assembly Schematic 
 
Fig. 7. Vacuum vessel sector with installed service. 
limits of even the most powerful computer-aided design 
(CAD) tools in the hands of highly skilled design engineers. 
Unforeseen time extensions had been required to overcome 
such limitations. Fabrication risks were also expected, since it 
was foreseen that the design would challenge the tools and 
experts in manufacturing and inspection as it had in design. 
The mitigation plans included a vigorous system engineering 
program, a manufacturing R&D program involving qualifica-
tion of competing suppliers, and contingency. Notably, assem-
bly risks were not identified. This was because the assembly 
process design had not matured enough to make the risks ap-
parent and because assembly risks were judged, based on past 
experience, to be small in comparison with the manufacturing 
risks associated with the modular coils and vacuum vessel. 
 
The project baseline included a cost contingency of 28% 
and a schedule contingency of 5 months (~10%) to help man-
age risks. The cost contingency was developed by rating each 
work package on an industry-standard “risk factor” scale, 
based on the novelty of the design, impact on the critical path, 
and the quality of the basis of estimate (i.e., catalog price of an 
off-the-shelf item vs. engineering judgment of a highly devel-
opmental design). The maximum work package contingency 
was 40%. Schedule contingency was based on management 
judgment and experience with previous, albeit less compli-
cated, projects. In summary, while the cost contingency was 
developed using a bottom-up “risk-based” methodology, the 
contingency estimates were not based on a detailed quantita-
tive analysis of risk consequences.  
 
B. Project Execution, 2004-2007 
Following sponsor approval of the baseline budget and 
schedule, the project proceeded immediately with its R&D 
plans for the modular coils and vacuum vessel, and it contin-
ued to develop the engineering design of the system. All costs, 
including R&D, were charged against the project budget; there 
was no separate budget for development costs. 
 
The manufacturing R&D program for the modular coil 
winding forms (MCWF) and the vacuum vessel segments was 
technically successful. 9 Competing suppliers developed de-
tailed manufacturing plans, built prototypes, and produced 
sound proposals for production. Similarly, PPPL developed 
processes for modular coil fabrication, produced a demonstra-
tion coil, and estimated production costs and schedules. 10  
Using the processes developed through these R&D activities, 
the project and its suppliers went on to fabricate the vacuum 
vessel and all modular coils in accordance with project re-
quirements. However, the cost of these three R&D/prototyping 
activities themselves exceeded the baseline estimate by 
34% 11 even though a crucial prototyping operation, MCWF 
machining, was cancelled by the project. (It was decided in-
stead to defer machining process development to the produc-
tion phase.) Moreover, the experience of fabricating actual 
prototypes showed that the baseline production cost estimates 
were low.  Ultimately, the actual cost to the project for pro-
duction of these components exceeded estimates by 90% and 
60% for the modular coils and vacuum vessel, respectively, 11 
and the critical path was impacted by several months. Signifi-
cantly, process development for MCWF machining, the only 
major operation that had not been prototyped, accounted for 
most of the schedule delay. 
 
The project continued to encounter challenges in its de-
sign activities, resulting in cost overruns and schedule delays. 
Design costs for the modular coils, toroidal field coils, and 
vacuum vessel exceeded baseline estimates by 210% 11. More 
importantly, the attendant delays in these tasks kept the pro-
ject’s top design engineers from moving on to other problems, 
for example the design of critical interface hardware and as-
sembly processes. Although the partnership arrangement be-
tween PPPL and ORNL provided valuable flexibility in meet-
ing engineering staffing needs, the project was unable to retain 
all of its key engineers for such protracted periods in the face 
of higher-priority needs for their services elsewhere in the 
fusion program.  
 
Faced with these challenges, the project nevertheless 
sought to manage its cost and schedule risks. Broadly speak-
ing, cost risks were managed by deferring to the operations 
phase any scope that could be deferred without compromising 
the safety of the machine or personnel, or the ability to satisfy 
end-of-project acceptance criteria. Even so, cost contingency 
had to be drawn at an unsustainable rate. Schedule risks were 
managed by giving priority in the allocation of funds to keep-
ing current critical path fabrication activities on schedule (e.g., 
the use of double-shift operation in modular coil fabrication). 
For a time, this strategy succeeded in meeting high-level mile-
stone commitments on schedule and maintaining the schedule 
contingency at 5 months. However, after critical-path needs 
were met, the remaining funds were insufficient to keep design 
work on schedule, especially after the project’s year-to-year 
funding profile was reduced in 2005. This led to a delay of 
nearly one year in the start of critical-path assembly operations 
in 2007. These delays were not foreseen because the project’s 
risk management approach did not focus adequately on the 
risks in future work. 
 
During this period, the project used a relatively simple 
critical issues tracking list as its main risk management tool. 
This was a living document which management used to ensure 
visibility of, and attention to, project risks. Newly recognized 
risks were added to the list, mitigation plans were documented 
and implemented, status was updated approximately quarterly, 
and risks were removed from the list when retired. It eventu-
ally became clear that this system was too informal, too quali-
tative, and too near-term focused to successfully manage the 
project’s risks.  
 
C. Risk Management Reforms, 2007-2008 
In 2007, the project undertook an overhaul of its risk man-
agement program, one of several measures taken in an attempt 
attempt to improve overall project performance. The critical 
issues list was replaced by a more complete, more detailed, 
and more quantitative risk register. More importantly, the risk 
register was used by the project team as a tool for systemati-
cally improving: 1) identification and assessment of risks; 
2) mitigation of risks; 3) establishment of risk retirement dead-
lines; 4) quantification of risk cost and schedule consequences 
as a basis for contingency estimates; and 5) tracking of risks to 
retirement. Detailed descriptions of the contingency analysis 
methodology are provided elsewhere 12; here we focus on the 
management aspects. 
 
Risk identification. The entire project team became in-
volved in identifying risks. The risk-identification exercise 
was coupled with a bottom-up analysis and re-estimate of all 
remaining work, an ideal context for simultaneously conduct-
ing a thorough risk assessment. A series of brainstorming 
meetings was efficient in taking advantage of the team’s ma-
ture (by then) understanding of project risks. The interaction 
was vital for ensuring that past cost and schedule problems 
were considered in evaluating future risks, and for making 
work package managers aware of problems arising in other 
areas which could affect theirs. For example, assembly man-
agers gained a full appreciation of the costs and risks associ-
ated with metrology only after understanding the metrology 
problems experienced in modular coil fabrication. Difficulties 
in design often foreshadowed difficulties in fabrication. Con-
verely, solutions and experience gained in one work package 
could reduce the assessed risks in other work packages to 
which the information was transferable. Care was taken to 
distinguish risks (adverse outcomes and their consequences) 
from sources of risks (conditions, such as design immaturity or 
lack of staffing depth); and to distinguish risk (discrete poten-
tial occurrences) from estimating uncertainty. 
 
Risk mitigation. As risks were identified, mitigation plans 
were defined. The associated work (e.g., R&D, analysis, test-
ing) was estimated, budgeted in the appropriate work package 
(not necessarily the impacted work package), and assigned to a 
responsible individual. 
 
Risk retirement deadlines. While the goal is to retire risks 
and avoid their impacts, it is recognized that risk mitigation 
plans might not always fully succeed. In that case, the residual 
risk consequences must be accepted and incorporated into the 
project baseline. For each risk, a retirement deadline (usually a 
scheduled event such as a design review or the start of a par-
ticular assembly operation) was established. If the risk were 
not retired by the deadline, project management was prompted 
to make a decision to either apply contingency in order to ab-
sorb the consequences or, if warranted, to extend the deadline. 
 
Risk quantification as a basis for contingency estimates. 
Each identified risk was assessed in terms of its likelihood of 
occurrence, from not credible (probability of occurrence <1%) 
to very likely (>80%), taking into account any mitigation 
plans. Also assessed were the cost and critical-path schedule 
impacts if the risk were to occur. These estimates provided 
quantitative input to a probabilistic analysis that was used to 
estimate the cost and schedule contingency required to manage 
risk. (A similar analysis was performed to estimate the contin-
gency required to cover estimating uncertainty).  
 
Risk register design. As we have discussed, the NCSX 
risk register became a useful tool for managing risk.  Although 
the risk register was a simple two-dimensional table, its value 
improved over time through careful design. 
 
Risk Organization (“rows”).  There were as many as 100 
outstanding risks entered in the NCSX risk register at a given 
time. Surprisingly, organizing strictly according to the project 
work breakdown structure (WBS) was not ideal because some 
risks affected multiple work packages, and often the risk 
source (cause) and the risk consequences were in different 
work packages. At the time of these reforms, the project had 
completed fabrication of its most risky components; had com-
pleted most, though not all, of the design; and was beginning a 
long series of risky assembly operations, known as Stages 2, 3, 
5, and 6 (Stage 4 having been previously merged with other 
operations and eliminated). A hybrid risk categorization, 
partly WBS-based and partly sequence-based, was found to be 
the most useful. The NCSX risk categories were: 
1. Management and organization: mostly risks to the project 
cost and schedule stemming from the potential loss of 
specific individuals with unique knowledge or skills due 
to re-assignment, retirement, etc. 
2. Generic assembly risks: the most serious being the poten-
tial for cost and schedule growth as the assembly re-
quirements became better understood. The source of this 
risk was the incompleteness of the design, for both com-
ponents and assembly processes, for the later assembly 
stages. The potential for problems with high-tech metrol-
ogy systems were another important source of risk. 
3. Stage-specific assembly risks. 
a. Stage 2- Half-period module assembly: mainly the 
risk of cost and schedule growth in meeting demand-
ing assembly tolerances. 
b. Stage 3-  Coil half-period to vacuum vessel assembly: 
for example the risk of schedule growth to correct for 
excessive sag or distortion in the joining of large sub-
assemblies. 
c. Stage 5-  Final field period assembly: the main risk 
being the potential for cost and schedule growth to re-
work large components to correct for excessive dis-
tortions or interferences. 
d. Stage 6- Final device assembly: the main risk being 
the potential for cost and schedule growth for re-
working components or for making up the difficult 
final assembly joint connecting the three field periods 
at vacuum vessel and coil structure interfaces. 
4. Startup: for example the risk of unexpected costs and de-
lays to repair damage due to electrical faults when com-
missioning the magnet system.  Despite careful electrical 
insulation design to minimize such risks, the possibility of 
faults could be excluded since they are almost universally 
experienced in the startup of new fusion experiments. 
5. Components and systems: for example the potential for 
cost and schedule growth as the design matures and fabri-
cation requirements become better understood. 
It is clear from the foregoing discussion that of the many risks 
identified at the time period in question, most arose from two 
fundamental causes: the demanding tolerances and the incom-
pleteness of the design. At an earlier or later stage of the pro-
ject, a different risk register organization might have been 
appropriate. Bearing in mind that the risk register is a tool to 
facilitate effective management, flexibility in its design should 
be maintained to match the time-varying needs of the project. 
 
Risk Attributes (“columns”).  Risk identification alone is 
useful for raising the visibility of risks, but further characteri-
zation of each risk was necessary to adequately understand 
and mange the risks on NCSX. As we have already discussed, 
a thorough risk analysis process considers risk causes, quanti-
tative consequences, mitigation plans, staff responsibilities, 
and retirement deadlines. The results of this analysis defined a 
set of risk attributes, summarized here, which were docu-
mented in the columns of the NCSX risk register. 
1. A unique number. Useful for reference and sorting. 
2. Affected work package(s).  Those that will be impacted if 
the risk occurs. 
3. Risk Description.  A potential adverse outcome or occur-
rence with cost, schedule, or technical consequences for 
the project. Opportunities, potential events with beneficial 
consequences such as labor rate changes or the implemen-
tation of new technology are also included. 
4. Mitigation plan.  The activities being undertaken to elimi-
nate the risk or reduce its impacts, and the individuals re-
sponsible. All NCSX mitigation activities were required 
to be budgeted and scheduled in the project’s baseline. 
5. Retirement deadline. A date or, more often, a scheduled 
event such as a design or start of an operation, by which 
time the risk, if not retired, would be accepted and ab-
sorbed. 
6. Owner. The individual responsible for tracking the risk 
and reporting on its status. Typically the manager of the 
impacted work package but in some cases the manager of 
the mitigation activity. 
7. Current status.  A brief narrative status summary of the 
risk and any mitigation activities, updated monthly. 
8. Likelihood of occurrence. A designator corresponding to 
the assessed probability of the risk occurring, updated as 
appropriate. Ideally, the likelihood decreases to zero over 
time, and is retired. 
9. Cost impacts:  Estimated cost to the project if the risk 
were to occur. In the case of opportunties, the estimated 
cost benefit is tabulated as a negative amount. 
10. Schedule impact;  Estimate extension of the project criti-
cal path if the risk were to occur, or estimated time sav-
ings in the case of opportunities.  For simplicity, risks or 
opportunities in non-critical tasks were considered to have 
zero schedule risk in the NCSX risk analysis. 
11. Basis of estimate.  A brief narrative of how the cost and 
schedule impacts were estimated. 
 
Risk tracking. Once an adequate risk register was estab-
lished, it was actively maintained as a living document and 
used as a risk management tool.  Monthly earned-value status 
meetings with work package managers were expanded to also 
cover risk status. Risk owners provided monthly updates on 
the status of their risks and any mitigation activities. 
 
Results. In April, 2008 the project presented a new bot-
tom-up estimate for completing NCSX construction, including 
cost and schedule contingencies of 36% and 19 months (40%), 
respectively. Risk accounted for cost and schedule contingen-
cies of 15% and 12 months (25%), respectively; the remainder 
was due to uncertainty. The larger relative contingencies (as 
compared with the original baseline) reflect a greatly im-
proved understanding of the project work requirements and 
associated risks as a result of design advancements and fabri-
cation experiences, as well as improvements in risk assess-
ment and contingency analysis. Improved understanding also 
led to increased estimates of the cost and time duration for 
completing the remaining work. Unfortunately, the rising 
trends in the recognized risks and costs were unacceptable to 
the sponsor and led to the decision to close the project. 
 
While the new baseline was not accepted, the project was 
authorized to complete certain tasks after the cancellation de-
cision. This provided an opportunity, albeit limited, to imple-
ment the new risk management program for about six months.  
Coil production was nearing completion at the time of cancel-
lation and was thus assessed as a low-risk activity by then. 
Completion of the work was routine.  However, the assembly 
of three-coil half-period modules (Stage 2) was just beginning 
and had multiple risks due to the many technical challenges in 
meeting the ±0.5 mm assembly tolerance allocated to that step. 
The project was able to complete two modules within toler-
ance before final project closure, and in so doing retired sev-
eral of the risks. The project was also able to complete a trial 
installation of a half-period module over one of the vacuum 
vessel sectors (one of the critical steps in Stage 3). 
 
The evolution of  project risks in the period between the 
proposal of the new baseline (“Init”) and the conclusion of 
work (“Final”) is summarized in Table 1. Simple cost (sched-
ule) risk metrics, defined as the sum of risk probabilities times 
the estimated cost (schedule) impact, are tabulated for each 
risk category.  [These metrics are not the same as the risk-
based contingency, which uses a more sophisticated analysis, 
but are meant to be indicative of the level of risk.]  Negative 
risk metrics appear because of the inclusion of opportunities as 
well as risks. 
 
As a result of the work performed in Stage 2 (two half-
period modules completed), the overall cost risk in completing 
the remaining four half-period modules was reduced by 71% 
and schedule risk was reduced by 100%. The work completed 
in Stage 3 (a trial of one critical step), led to partial risk reduc-
tions in the Stage 3 work.  Although no work was done in  
Stage 5 during this period, cost risks were reduced through 
design changes in components to be assembled in that stage. 
Risk assessments were continuously updated as design and 
assembly progressed, leading to improved understanding and 
both increases and decreases in assessed risk. The progress 
made in assembly during this short interval made a significant 
reduction (23%) in the project’s overall schedule risk.  In the 
components and systems area, where the largest cost risks 
resided, no new design or fabrication tasks were started, so 
there was little opportunity for cost risk reduction. The number 
of risks retired during this period exceeded the number of new 
risks identified, so there was a net decrease from 89 to 69 in 
the total number of risks. 
 
IV. LESSONS LEARNED 
The NCSX project achieved important technical successes, 
including the fabrication of major components and subassem-
blies with complex geometries, meeting stringent tolerance 
requirements. Risk reduction strategies incorporated into the 
design and R&D planning succeeded in a technical sense. Pro-
totyping reduced the risks in complex manufacturing processes 
in advance of production; when prototyping was not per-
formed, adverse cost and schedule impacts resulted. Cost and 
schedule performance was not satisfactory, in part because the 
project’s initial risk management program was inadequate. Im-
portant risk management lessons were derived from both the 
success and failures on NCSX. The project sought to incorpo-
rate these lessons in a new baseline, including an improved risk 
management program, for completing the project. To a limited 
extent the project was able to test the efficacy of these reforms. 
Significant progress in risk reduction was obtained, although 
risks increased in some areas as understanding improved. 
Overall, the risk management reforms were a step toward im-
proved visibility and management of risks and more predict-
able outcomes. We summarize the lessons learned in the expec-
tation that they will be useful to other high-risk projects. 
1. Adoption of a design concept that is robust against the 
uncertainties that exist in the early stages of a project is an 
effective risk mitigation strategy. 
2. Manufacturing R&D, including the fabrication of proto-
types, is an effective strategy for reducing risks and im-
proving estimates for production. 
3. Trim coils can be used to compensate for field errors due 
to construction errors and to control island widths, accord-
ing to magnetic analysis.  Given the importance of mag-
netic field accuracy in toroidal device design (including 
tokamaks and stellarators) and the high cost of meeting 
stringent tolerance requirements, trim coils have the poten-
tial for mitigating cost and schedule risks during construc-
tion and performance risks during operation.  Their poten-
tial should be more fully explored. 
4. Adequate engineering staffing, especially in the design and 
R&D phases of a project, is critical for advancing the un-
derstanding of risks and costs as rapidly as possible. (The 
Wendelstein 7-X team drew similar conclusions.13) Con-
versely, the possibility of losing engineering staff, espe-
cially key individuals with unique or specialized skills, can 
be a risk with significant cost and schedule consequences. 
5. The completeness and accuracy of risk assessment grows 
with design maturity and fabrication experience. Early risk 
assessments may miss or underestimate project risks. Risk 
assessment must continue throughout the project to ensure 
that emerging risks are recognized and managed. Ideally, 
complete as much of the design and R&D as possible be-
fore committing to an estimate. 
6. An up-to-date understanding of requirements, costs, and 
risks in all of the remaining work to complete the project 
must be maintained and must be used to support risk man-
agement decision-making. Too near-term a focus may 
yield near-term successes at the cost of major downstream 
failures. 
7. A documented, quantitative, bottom-up risk assessment 
provides a sound and defensible basis for estimating both 
cost and schedule contingencies at any stage of the project. 
It can be used to track risks and mitigation activities on a 
monthly basis and to inform management decisions. 
8. A risk register, tabulating risks and their key attributes, is 
most effective if developed early in the project, updated 
frequently, and actively used as a risk management tool. 
Careful risk register design and flexibility to meet the 
Table 1. Evolution of NCSX Risks between Baseline Proposal and Conclusion of Work 
 Number of risks 
Cost Risk  
Metric ($k) 
Schedule Risk 
Metric (months) 
  Init Final ∆% Init Final ∆% Init Final ∆% 
1. Mgt. & Org. 12 12 0%  (209)  (229) 10% 1.4 0.9 -35% 
2. Generic assy. 7 4 -43%  761   907  19% 2.5 2.4 -5% 
3. Stage-specific                
 a. Stage 2 10 2 -80%  102   30  -71% 1.5 0.0 -100% 
 b. Stage 3 6 3 -50%  59   44  -25% 1.2 1.0 -19% 
 c. Stage 5 8 8 0%  233   108  -54% 0.5 0.5 0% 
 d. Stage 6 17 14 -18%  67   67  0% 2.4 2.2 -6% 
4. Startup 14 14 0%  76   70  -8% 1.7 1.5 -10% 
5. Comp./Sys. 15 12 -20%  867   914  5% 0.3 0.3 0% 
Totals 89 69 -22%  1,956   1,911  -2% 11.3 8.7 -23% 
 
time-varying needs of the project are important to maxi-
mize usefulness. 
9. Cross-work package communication is essential for risk 
assessment.  Problems encountered in one work package 
may cause risks in another.  Risks encountered in one 
work package may portend similar risks for other work 
packages, especially if similar technologies are used. 
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